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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOWE RENTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
JOHN WORTHEN, dba Exotic 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to recover the cost of repair to a 
cement mixer plaintiff had leased to defendant, and 
which came loose while defendant was towing it. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case came to the court for trial, and judgment 
\ms awarded to plaintiff on the statements of counsel 
ancl the pleadings, without the introduction of evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a 
11cw trial. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is in the business of leasing equipment to 
the public. Defendant, a swimming pool builder, on Au 
gust 4, 1962, rented a large two-wheeler cement mixer 
from plaintiff, and signed a lease which stated in part, 
''Lessee assumes all liability for damages from accident 
caused by or incurred in the use or transportation or 
said equipment, and agrees to indemnify and hold harm-
less the said Lessor, its officers, agents and employees 
from any and all damages and/or liability to any person 
whomsoever arising out of or resulting from the use, 
storage or transportation of said equipment by the Lessee 
or by anyone else while the equipment is in the custody 
of the Lessee. Lessee acknowledges receipt of the equip-
ment in good working condition and repair and agrees 
to return it in as good condition, subject to reasonable 
wear and tear, and Lessee shall be liable for all damage 
to or loss of the equipment regardless of cause until it 
shall have been returned to and receipted for by thP 
Lessor." (Ex. P-1) 
Without assistance from defendant, plaintiff at-
tached the mixer to defendant's two-ton truck (R. 4, 7, 
38), by means of a chain and ball hitch. The connection 
was made as illustrated in defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 
and 4 (R. 34, 35, 36, 37). The bolt of the ball hitch was 
passed through a hole on a trailer tow plate welded to 
the truck. Plaintiff had no safety catch on the ball 
hitch. 
2 
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The mixer had a metal chain welded to its towing 
har. Plaintiff connected the chain directly to the frame 
of the truck. (R. 34.) 
The mixer was rented at 5 :53 p.m., Saturday, Au-
gust 4, 1962, at plaintiff's place of business at 2375 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant drove 
directly to his home at 620 Grand Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the trailer remained there attached to the 
truck, and untouched to defendant's knowledge, until 
:\Ionday, Augsut 6, 1962. Defendant then started to drive 
to Logan. About thirty-three miles from his starting 
point at plaintiff's place of business, the mixer came 
loose, the chain snapped and the mixer overturned, caus-
ing it damage. No other damage or injury is involved 
in this case. Defendant at no time touched the truck -
mixer connections before the accident. After the accident 
defendant observed that the towing bar was bent sharply 
upward (R. 3, 7, 38, 39). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF ITS STATU-
TORY DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC CONSTI-
TUTED NEGLIGENCE AND WAS A PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS. 
Plaintiff violated the provisions of 41-6-117 UCA, 
1953, and 41-6-148.40 UCA, 1953, as amended 1961. 
"41-6-117. VEHICLE IN UNSAFE CONDITION OR 
IMPROPERLY EQUIPPED-VIOLATION OF AcT-MrsDE-
3 
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MEANOR - AccEssonrns - ExcEPTION AS To FAi:i· 
IMPLEMENTS AND RoAD l\IAcrrINEilY. - (a) ft is .n 
misdemeanor for any person to drive or move 111 
for the owner to cause or knowingly 7Jer111d fiJ /,, 
driren. or moved on any highway any vehiclf' 111 
combinaiion of rehicles which is in sul'h u11sn1, 
condition as to endanger any person, or which r/n 1., 
not contain those parts or is not at all ti 1111., 
equipped with such lamps and other equipment i, 
proper condition and adjustment as required i
1
, 
this article, or which is equipped in any manner i11 
violation of this act, or for any person to do am 
act forbidden or fail to perform any act require;! 
under this act." (Emphasis added) 
The absence on the hitch of a safety catch on the nul 
and bolt (R. 36) might in itself be construed to be at 1 
"unsafe condition," because the towing of a vehicle wll 
loosen the connection. 'l'he owner knowingly permittiu~ 
towing of his rented units knO"ws that some will becomi 
separated unless safety catches are used. 
"41-6-148.40. SAFETY CHAINS OF TowED \"1-
HICLES REQUIRED - ExcEPTIONS - SAFETY Cmm 
ON TRAILERs-E1 1ery toiced vehicle shall be cntr 
pled by means of a safety chain, cable, or equiYi· 
lent device, in addition to the regular trailer hilrl1 
or coupling. 
(a) Such safety chain, cable or equivalent. ck 
vice shall be securely connected with the chassis nl 
the towing vehicle, the toiced i·ehicle and 1111 
drawbar. 
(b) It shall be of sufficient material anil 
strength to preyent the two vehicles from hrcoro· 
ing separated, and shall have no more slack f/iall 
is necessary for proper turning. 
4 
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( c) Such safety chain, cable or equivalent <le-
\'ice shall be attached to the trailer drawbar (so) 
as to vrevent it from dropping to the ground, and 
to assure the towed vehicle follows substantially 
in the course of the towing vehicle in case the ve-
liicl e ( s) become separated. 
( <l) This requirement does not apply to a 
semitrailer having a connecting device composed 
of a fifth wheel and king pin assembly, nor to a 
pole trailer." (Emphasis added) 
This statute implements 41-6-117, UCA, 1953. Plain-
tiff violated this statute in two ways: (1) The chain was 
so slack that the towing bar hit the ground when the ve-
hicles became separated, and (2) The chain was not con-
nected to the mixer chassis (R. 34). 
Had plaintiff complied with the foregoing statutes, 
no loss would have occurred. These statutes were en-
adecl for the protection of the public. Their violation, 
when proximately causing an injury is negligence. 
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791. 
POINT 2. 
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE REQUIRING DE-
FENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE CANNOT BE 
ENFORCED. 
For a contract to require one person to insure an-
other against the other's own negligence, two things are 
required: First, the contract language must be so ex-
plirit that there is no doubt that both parties intended 
one to insure the other, and Second, the agreement must 
5 
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not be contrary to public policy. Union Pacific Ry. c11 • 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P2d 910· 
Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 371 P2d 131 (Kans.), 
Otis Eleuator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 33 P2<l 
974 (Colo). 
In regard to the contract language, it states in part. 
" ... Lessee shall be liable for all damage to or loss of 
the equipment regardless of cause until it shall have bm 
returned .... '' This language is not so explicit as to ad 
vise defendant that he had to look back over his shoulder 
for sabotage from plaintiff. If the contract after, "re-
gardless of cause,'' had added merely "including negli-
gence of Lessor,'' then it would be truly explicit. Willis-
ton on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 1938, §1041, sets forth the 
general principle, 
''The bailor is subject to the same implied war-
wanties as one who sold goods. Therefore the 
hailor is liable if he knowingly furnishes property 
unsuitable for the purpose for which it was 
hired.'' 
To relieve a party of his obligation is contrary to this 
policy of the law and both very precise wording to that 
effect, and, as applied, a loss which the parties would con-
template as coming within the insuring clause, are re-
quired for such a shift of responsibility. This is stated 
in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co .. 
supra, 
''In resolving a dispute about the. int~rp1:eta­
tion of provisions in a contract the obJechve i~ to 
determine what the parties intended at the tnm 
it was executed; and if the intent with respect to 
6 
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some unf orseseen subsequent occurrence is not 
clearly articulated, what would have been their 
intent if their minds had adverted to such an oc-
eurrence. In pursuing the latter alternative, as 
we are required to do in this instance, there are 
some further basic principles which are helpful on 
our problem. The first is that each party is en-
titled to assume that the other intends to con-
duct himself as a reasonable and prudent person 
should under whatever circumstances may there-
after arise, which presupposes that he will commit 
no wrongful act nor be guilty of negligence.'' 
In regard to public policy, the basic principle is that 
a party may not, by contract, relieve himself of a duty of 
care which he owes to the public. In Hunter v . .American 
Rentals, Inc., supra, lessee of a rental trailer sued the 
lessor for damages sustained when the trailer came loose 
due to lessor's negligence. The court found the lessee 
to be a member of the public to whom the lessor owed 
duties of care. Lessor sought to avoid liability based on 
the follO"wing lease clause, "The renter hereby absolves 
the American Rentals of any responsibility or obliga-
tion in the event of an accident, regardess of causes or 
consequences, and that any costs, claims, court or attor-
ney fees, or liability resulting from the use of described 
equipment will be indemnified by the renter regardless 
against whom the claimant or claimants institute action.'' 
The court held this clause to be void and unenforceable as 
contrary to public policy, stating, 
''There is no doubt that the rule that forbids a 
person to protect himself by agreement against 
damages resulting from his own negligence applies 
where the agreement protects him against the 
7 
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consequences of a breach of some duty imposei' 
by law." (371 P2d at 133.) 
It might be argued that Hunter v. American Re11tol. 
Inc., dealt with damage, not to the rental unit, but to iii. 
lessee's person and car, and that the only item in issu1 
in the case at bar is the mixer, and that defendant iii 
sured it. This argument might have validity under soni, 
circumstances. For example, if lessee, while using !lie 
mixer, burned out the motor because lessor had hrt
11 
negligent by not lubricating it, lessee might he liahli· 
Under those circumstances issues of public policy ar1 
not involn•d. Here, ho",ever, plaintiff seeks to reconr 
for a loss caused, or contributed to, hy plaintiff's 01n 
breach of safety statutes. To give plaintiff relief woul1l 
allow plaintiff to operate outside the law. Union Pard11 
Ry. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra, states thi· 
matter as follows, 
"A closely related proposition pertinent hrr, 
is that the law does not look "·ith favor upon one 
exacting a covenant to relie,,e himself of the basi1· 
duty \d1ich the la"· impos0s on ever:vone: that 0i 
nsi~O' due cnre for the saf0tv of himself and otl1 
ers. '"'This would tencl to e1;courage ca releRsnr>' 
and would net he salutan· either for the pers011 
seeking to protect himself or for those whos" 
safefr mav he hazarded hv his <'ondnct. For the'" 
reas~ns st~ch covenants a;e sometim0s derlarrd i11· 
valid as being against public polic~·. Howcwr 
this mav depend upon the <'ircnmstanPes. Tlw.m:; 
iorifr r
0
ule appears to he that in most situati.on' 01 
• • cl ! I where s1wh is the desir0 of the parties, an t ' 
clearlv understood and expressed, such a covenan' 
will l;e upheld. But the presumption is ag-at11 '1 
8 
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any such intention, and it is not achieved by infer-
ence or implication from general language such 
as was employed here. It will be regarded as a 
binding contractual obligation only when that in-
tention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
''If it had been the intent of the parties that 
the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff even 
against the latter's negligent acts, it would have 
been easy enough to use that very language and to 
thus make that intent clear and unmistakable, 
which was not done here.'' 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING, 
409 Bost-On Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
9 
.Attorney for Defendant 
and .Appellant 
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